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THE RIGHT TO COMPETE FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT.*
George William Curtis stated the purpose of civil service
reformers, as early as 1869, in these words: "What we want is
to intrench the principle and practice of Washington in the
law." (II. Orations and Addresses, 9). The pioneer step to this
end had been taken in Congress two years earlier, when Thomas
J. Jenckes presented his report on the condition of the civil
service, accompanied by a bill "to regulate the civil service of
the United States and to promote its efficiency."
This early desire to embody the proposed reform in the law
of the land found its first expression in the ninth section of the
sundry appropriations bill of March 3, 1871. This measure
authorizes the President "to prescribe such rules and regula-
tions for the admission of persons into the civil service of the
United States as will best promote the efficiency thereof, and
ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health,
character, knowledge and ability for the branch of service into
which he seeks to enter." It also authorized the President "to
employ suitable persons to conduct said inquiries, to prescribe
their duties, and to establish regulations for the conduct of per-
sons who may receive appointments in the civil service."
This early recognition that the proposed reform must find
expression in the law, shows how clearly its pioneers compre-
hended the nature of the mighty task to which they had set their
hands. The story of what followed their first success in secur-
ing legal recognition of the reform-of the appointment by
President Grant of an admirable commission headed by Mr.
Curtis, of the active opposition by the spoilsmen, of the indiffer-
ence of public sentiment, and finally in 1875 of the refusal of
appropriations by Congress and consequent suspension of the
rules-is too well known to require recounting here.
The early leaders of the reform movement, in seeking "to
intrench the principle and practice of Washington in the law,"
made no mistake in the remedy for the monstrous evils of the
spoils system. They failed for the moment sufficiently to real-
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ize that law, to be effective under free institutions, must be the
command of popular opinion. However, to them the failure of
the Act of 1871 was only a repulse. They at once appealed from
Congress to the people. By a few years of well-directed agita-
tion they aroused and informed public opinion. The direct re-
sults were the national act of 1883, the New York act of the
same year, the Massachusetts act of 1884, the New York con-
stitutional provision of 1894, the Illinois act of 1895, and recent
charter provisions of various cities. These achievements mark
the progress of a rising and active popular sentiment in support
of the merit system, which gives bright promise of its early ex-
tension to our entire civil service, national, state and municipal.
The legal situation is just now of peculiar interest. In
Massachusetts, where the reform of course found a congenial
atmosphere, it has been accepted as part and parcel of the ortho-
dox faith. This happy result was not reached without some
difficulty and even litigation. The appointing officers and the
courts were for a time much perplexed by the veteran prefer-
ence legislation; but a way has finally been found to recognize
two privileged classes, women and veterans, under legislation
the general purpose of which is to open public employment to
the free competition of all. The Supreme Court in the case of
Brown v. Russell, x66 Mass. x4, early in x896, held the act of
1895, which required the appointment of any veteran to any
position for which he and three citizens of his selection might
certify him to be qualified, to be unconstitutional. Thereupon,
by act of 1896, it was provided thatveterans found to be quali-
fied upon examination shall be preferred in appointment to all
others, except women. The act also permits appointing officers to
appoint or employ veterans without examination. This act the
court by a majority of four to three has sustained, on the ground
that the Legislature may have considered that veterans, otherwise
qualified, are "likely to possess courage, constancy, habits f obe-
dience and fidelity, which are valuable qualifications for any
public office or employment; or that the recognition of the
service of veterans in the way provided for by the statute would
encourage that love of country and devotion to the welfare of
the state which it concerns the commonwealth to foster." The
minority of the court refuse to concede that the fact of being a
veteran bears such relation to the duties of a present office or
employment in the civil service that it can be made a decisive
test in the selection of persons for employment, or that service
in the army or navy in the late war is the only way to acquire
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special fitness for public employment. They say: "The impor-
tant matter is to get the best possible service, and the selections
should be made with reference to the qualifications or fitness for
the performance of the duties which are to be performed. And,
since this is so, it is not within the constitutional power of the
Legislature to fix as a decisive test anything which does not bear
such a relation to the duties to be performed as to show special
fitness for the performance of those duties." It is evident that
the act thus sustained has at least gone to the extreme limit in
securing a class preference by law.
The legal situation in New York shows that the fully-evolved
spoilsman is not awed even in the presence of a constitutional
provision. The constitution of 1894 requires that "appointments
and promotions in the civil service of the State, and of all civil
divisions thereof, * * * shall be according to merit and
fitness, to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by examination,
which, so far as practicable, shall be competitive." The Court
of Appeals, in the case of People v. Roberts, 148 N. Y. 148,
broadly says, "The principle that all appointments in the civil
service must be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascer-
tained by competitive examinations, is expressed in such broad
and imperative language that in some respects it must be re-
garded as beyond the control of the Legislature, and secure
from any statutory changes. If the Legislature should repeal
all the statutes and regulations on the subject of appointments
in the civil service, the mandate of the constitution would still
remain, and would so far execute itself as to require the courts,
in a proper case, to pronounce appointments made without com-
pliance with its requirements illegal."
The same court, in the case of Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N.
Y. 345, 358, holds, that the question whether the examination of
a candidate for a public position is practicable, is judicial and
depends upon the nature and character of the duties of the posi-
tion. This case presented the question whether a clerk to the
committees of the Brooklyn board of aldermen, an assistant
warrant clerk, a dockmaster, a chief clerk, a law clerk, a sur-
veyor, a finance clerk, a license fee collector, a department sec-
retary, a commissioner's clerk and a deputy license clerk, are
within the constitutional provision, it appearing that they had
been appointed without competitive examination. The plaintiffs
produced a mass of evidence, including examination papers, re-
ports and various civil service regulations, to show that com-
petitive examinations for the appointments in question are prac-
THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.
ticable. The defendants produced no evidence to show that
they are impracticable. The trial justice held "that it was and
is practicable to ascertain the merit and fitness of a person to be
appointed to each of said positions by competitive examina-
tion." The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held that
"none of these appointees fall within the debatable class, but
were plainly susceptible of being filled by competitive examina-
tion." (14 App. Div. Reps. 497).
The Court of Appeals, by a majority of four to three, re-
versed the lower courts, holding generally, that where the duties
of a position are not merely clerical, and are such as especially
devolve upon the head of the office, which, by reason of his
numerous duties, he is compelled to delegate to others, the per-
formance of which, require skill, judgment, trust and confidence,
and involve the responsibility of the officer or the municipality
which he represents, the position should be treated as confiden-
tial. (152 N. Y. 360).
The conclusion of the majority of the court was strongly
contested in dissenting opinions by Judges Gray and O'Brien, in
the first of which Chief Judge Andrews concurred. They
pointed out that the six Justices below were unanimous in find-
ing, upon uncontradicted evidence, that it was practicable to fill
all the places in question by competitive examinations, and that
"the obvious effect of the constitution was to remove the eleven
places in question from the non-competitive schedule since it
was practicable to fill them all by competitive examination."
(152 N. Y. 386, 393). Judge O'Brien, in his very able dissent-
ing opinion, correctly stated the situation in these words: "The
future of the law which now rests upon the basis of the constitu-
tion is dependent upon the decision of this court. The decision
in this case will either place the reform upon a reasonable and
just basis, and command the approval of all good men, or it will
be a step backward." (Id. p. 389). While the majority of the
court frankly announce that, "should time and experience prove
that we are in error * * * we shall not hesitate to carry out
the spirit and intent of the law." (Id. p. 360), it is to be remem-
bered that the Court of Appeals must alone determine what the
spirit and intent Qf the constitution require.
The prevailing opinion in the Chittenden-Wurster case must
be regarded as a loose construction of the constitutional require-
ment that appointments and promotions shall be according to
merit and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive examination,
so far as practicable. It is "a step backward," by a great court
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which had from the outset led in judicial support of the merit
system. In the presence of a judgment so favorable to the
spoilsmen, resting as it does upon the opinion of four of the
Judges, against that of three others unanimously supported by
the six Justices of the Supreme Court who passed upon the case
below, the Court of Appeals can no longer truly say what it said
in the Roberts case in speaking of the reform: "This court,
upon more than one occasion, has, with entire unanimity, ex-
pressed its approval of the principle, and exercised all of its
powers in every proper case in aid of all laws intended to carry
out the idea." (r48 N. Y. 364). If the majority opinion of the
court is finally to prevail, the constitutional provision of New
York, requiring competitive xaminations so far as practicable,
falls far short of the Illinois statute which provides that all appli-
cants for positions in the classified service, from which but few
places are excluded, "'shall be subjected to examination, which
shall be public, competitive and free to all citizens of the United
States, with specified limitations as to residence, age, health,
habits and moral character."
The Legislature of New York, under an irresponsible dicta-
torship, has persistently neglected, since the adoption of the
constitutional provision of 1894, to provide appropriate legisla-
tion to give it full and affirmative effect, as commanded by the
constitution itself. This neglect was emphasized by the pass-
age, at the last session, of a act providing for two examinations
to ascertain the "merit and fitness" of candidates for appoint-
ment, one by the civil service commission to determine their
relative "merit," and one by, or under the authority of, the
appointing officer to satisfy him as to their "fitness." Each
examination is to cover one-half of the rating of candidates. It
is not in fact required that the so-called "examination" to
ascertain "'fitness" shall be competitive, or that it shall be pub-
lic or made matter of record. It may be conducted by "some
person or board designated by the person holding such power of
appointment." In plain words, this so-called examination may
be held at the party headquarters, on the street, or in the corner
saloon, and may be conducted by a political committee, the
party boss, or a convenient barkeeper. Mr. Schurz, in his pow-
erful address of protest to the Governor, properly suggested
that holding two examinations to ascertain "merit and fitness"
is like requiring two examinations by physicians to find whether
one is "hale and hearty," one as to whether he is "hale" and
the other as to whether he is "hearty."
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The act in question is the clumsy device of spoilsmen to nul-
lify the constitution of the State. That a conspiracy so transpa-
rent and subversive of public order can succeed is of course
impossible. There is nothing in the history of the courts of
New York to give any promise of success to an unlawful pur-
pose so obvious. In the prevailing opinion in the Chittenden-
Wurster case, written after the passage of this measure, the
Court of Appeals significantly said: . "It is said that each officer
having appointments to make could himself examine the appli-
cants for position, and in that way determine who should be the
appointee by a competitive examination. Undoubtedly, but it
will readily be seen that this system would practically nullify the
civil service law and bring it into disrepute." (152 N. Y. p.
356).
The submission of the "Black Bill" to the scrutiny of the
courts, which is soon to be made, can have but one result. The
certain defeat of this transparent attempt to nullify the constitu-
tion ought to prepare the way for the legislation which it com-
mands.
The change of administration in Chicago last April has sub-
jected the Illinois statute to a crucial test. Unfortunately, the
act did not go into effect until the July following its adoption at
the city election of 1895. That election resulted in a change
from democratic to republican control. The new Mayor
promptly turned out "the gang, "as his followers not inappropri-
ately called the democratic host, and installed "the boys," who
were expected to control in his interest the republican machine,
now euphoniously known as "the organization." This clean
sweep and substitution even extended to some six hundred mem-
bers of the police force. Having thus strikingly illustrated the
need, and prepared the way, for reform, Mayor Swift appointed
an excellent commission and thereafter cordially supported it.
This seeming inconsistency on his part is perhaps traceable to a
desire to mark the introduction of the merit system by a conver-
sion as dramatic as that of St. Paul. Possibly he sought at the
outset of his administration to put temptation behind him, or to
create a sort of solitude in which the new commission might
learn its duties and formulate the rules required by law. What-
ever the truth, the Mayor thereafter sustained the commission
while it worked out a thorough classification of the service, pre-
pared adequate rules, held many examinations and certified a
few eligibles for appointment. Under such conditions came the
change from republican to democratic rule in the election of
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Mayor Harrison last spring and a clean sweep of Mayor Swift's
personal appointees.
The Illinois statute is based on the national, New York and
Massachusetts acts. It differs from the earlier legislation in
that it is more inclusive and stringent in its provisions. The ex-
cluded "head or heads of any department" of the New York act
gives place to the "heads of any principal department" in the
statute of Illinois. Unrestricted removals under all prior legisla-
tion give way in Illinois to removals only for cause, to be ascer-
tained upon written charges after opportunity to the person
charged to be heard. The Illinois act also provides that vacan-
cies shall be filled by promotion where it is practicable; that
promotions shall be "on the basis of merit and seniority of
service and examination," and that "all examinations for pro-
motion shall be competitive."
The commissions under the Illinois statute are continuous and
independent bodies. Mayor Harrison, however, assumed the
Chicago commissioners to be his subordinates, and that a
majority of them should be in political and personal accord with
himself. Upon the refusal of the majority of the old commission
(the other member having been appointed Comptroller) to accept
his construction of the words, "heads of any principal depart-
ment,'" used in naming the excluded officials, to include some
fifty heads of bureaus in the departments, inspectors and cap-
tains of police and various foremen and others, the Mayor re-
moved the two remaining members on frivolous charges after-
wards trumped up to comply with a provision of the statute re-
quiring him to file his reasons for such removals. The new
commission promptly published an opinion construing the words,
"heads of any principal department," so as to exclude from the
classified service most of the desirable positions claimed by the
Mayor as spoils, thus giving him (to use their words) "the
benefit of the doubt" as to the positions which "should be taken
out of the classified service." The Mayor was thus enabled to
fill the higher places in the service with avowed and active ene-
mies of the merit system, an opportunity which he promptly
improved. His appointees, with some honorable exceptions, in
co~peration with the council, are doing what may be done to
place the civil service law in a false light before the public, and
-so far as practicable-to render it inoperative.
The statute excludes from the classified service "officers
* * I whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the
city council." When the act was adopted but few officials, some
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of them ofminor importance, were subject to such confirmation.
Upon the accession of Mayor Harrison it was feared by some of
the best friends of the law that it is especially vulnerable at this
point. Its enemies quickly sought to avail themselves of their
apparent opportunity. The council promptly created a consid-
erable number of new positions, making them all subject to-
confirmation by itself. The committee on civil service, on June
14, 1897, reported forms for four ordinances, recommending
their passage. By these measures it was gravely proposed to
designate as " 'heads of principal departments,' as said term is
used in section eleven" of the civil service act, numerous "pub-
lic officials" and "all employes of the City of Chicago receiving
three dollars or less per day, as compensation for work;" to
make "the head of each and every department, bureau or
division of work in the public service of Chicago," and certain
experts, private secretaries, head assistants and others, subject
to confirmation by the council; and to make all "transfers,
appointments, discharges and promotions in the fire and police
departments" subject to the order of the Mayor and approval of
the council. These extraordinary proposals were opposed by
the administration which was not prepared to attempt the com-
plete nullification of the statute. Two weeks later the council
passed, as an administration measure, an ordinance which pro-
vides that a considerable list of "officials" named "shall be de-
signated as 'heads of principal departments,' as said term is used
in section eleven" of the civil service act.
Some of the friends of the law, fearing these attacks were
aimed at a vital point, deemed it wise to endeavor to save some-
thing by acquiescence. Others, and notably the Citizens' Asso-
ciation, held that the way to save the law was to defend it
against all comers. The Citizens' Association retained special
counsel and procured the Attorney-General to file petitions, on
behalf of the people, in the Supreme Court for writs of manda-
mnus to obtain an authoritative and final interpretation of the law,
and of the power of the city council in respect to it. These
cases were fully presented to the court in October last, and early
decisions are expected. The new commission only contended
for a liberal construction of the words, "heads of any principal
department." The corporation counsel boldly attacked the con-
stitutionality of the act, and defended the ordinance which seeks
to make subordinate officials "heads of principal departments"
merely by thus designating them. The writer's relation to
these cases renders improper here any prophecy in regard to the
Y.ALE LA I JOURNL.
result. It must suffice here to say, that we hope for a judg-
ment by the court strongly sustaining the act, with a finding
that the ordinance is void as unreasonable and in conflict with
the statute.* The law is supported by public opinion.' The pen-
alties for its violation are severe. If fully sustained by the
court, it will be at least reasonably enforced.
The President, by his executive order of July 27, 1897,
directing that removals shall be made only for just cause, upon
written charges and opportunity to be heard, has raised the
question whether removals should be controlled by law. Civil
service reformers have hesitated to place any legal restraint
upon the power of removal by the appointing officer for any
cause satisfactory to him. They have assumed that such officers
will not be apt to remove efficient subordinates to make way for
unknown successors to be taken from the eligible list. As early
as 1881, in his address before The American Science Associa-
tion, Mr. Curtis said:
emoval for cause alone means, of course, removal for
legitimate cause, such as dishonesty, negligence or incapacity.
But who shall decide that such cause exists? This must be deter-
mined either by the responsible superior officer or by some other
authority. But if left to some other authority the right of coun-
sel and the forms of a court would be invoked; the whole legal
machinery of mandamuses, injunctions, certioraris, and the
rules of evidence, would be put in play to keep an incompetent
clerk at his desk or a sleepy watchman on his beat. Cause for
the removal of a letter-carrier in the post-office or of an account-
ant in the custom house would be presented with all the pomp
of impeachment and established like a high crime and mis-
demeanor." (II. Orations and Addresses, p. 19o).-
Mr. Curtis, in his second annual address as President of the
League in x883, also said: "We do not plead for fixed perma-
nence in public place, nor assert a vested right in public
employment. Due subordination and discipline are essential to
all effective organized service, and therefore, dismissal for pro-
per cause should be prompt and sure. To this end the power of
removal should be left as free as possible, provided that motives
for its illegitimate exercise are destroyed. Such a provision
*The Supreme Court of Illinois on December 22, 1897, handed down a
strong opinion in these cases holding the statute to be constitutional and the
ordinance in question void for unreasonableness. The court, in effect, holds
that the council has no power to add to the list of exclusions from the act.
This decision places the Illinois act on a firm basis.
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secures both proper discipline and a just tenure." (Id. p. 248).
Again, in his sixth annual address, he said: "The power of
removal no less than that of appointment is a public trust, and
it cannot be rightly used arbitrarily or for any other cause than
the public interest. Such cause should be publicly assigned and
recorded, that the people may clearly understand the reason of
the change in the service." (Id. p. 340).
These passages indicate what has been the generally
accepted view of reformers. Aside from the prohibition of re-
movals for political reasons, there was no attempt until recently
to limit the power of removal by appointing officers. The
framers of the Illinois act took the first step in advance by pro-
viding that "no officer or employe in the classified service * *
* shall be removed or discharged except for cause, upon writ-
ten charges and after an opportunity to be heard." From this
provision laborers and "persons having the custody of public
money, for the safe keeping of which another has given bond"
are excepted. "Such charges shall be investigated by or before
said civil service commission, or * * * some officer or board
appointed by said commission to conduct such investigation. The
finding and decision of such commission, or investigating officer
or board when approved by said commission, shall be certified
to the appointing officer, and shall be forthwith enforced by
such." (Act 1895, See. 12).
These provisions, it will be observed, make no attempt to de-
fine what causes shall be sufficient to justify removals. It is not
believed that the act confers upon those in the classified service
any vested right to continue in public employment, or to call
upon the courts to determine whether any alleged cause of re-
moval, except it be political, is sufficient to justify it. The
intention is to protect the classified service from arbitrary and
unjust removals by app6inting officers, and to prevent removals
for other than causes that will bear public record, after opportu-
nity to make defense. Under this act the commission is made
publicly responsible for every removal from the classified
service.
The question involved in the recent decisions of United
States courts, whether the President's order in respect to re-
movals has the force of law, is less important than the question
whether it ought to have such force. The answer to the first de-
pends upon the extent of executive power under the civil
service act to make rules that shall have the force of law. The
answer to the other must be sought in the further inquiry,
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whether public employment can be the subject of vested right,-
whether office is a place of public service, or a castle to be
privately held and enjoyed.
The merit system of appointment recognizes and protects the
right of all to compete for public employment, the right of free-
dom of contract with the largest employer of skilled and un-
skilled labor. The Massachusetts act provides for the punishment
of officials and others who shall "defeat, deceive or obstruct any
person in respect of his or her right of examination," (Sec. 18).
The constitution of New York requires all appointments to be
made upon "examination which, so far as practicable, shall be
competitive." The Illinois act provides that "all applicants for
offices or places in said classified service * * * shall be sub-
jected to examination, which shall be public, competitive and free
to all citizens of the United States, with specified limitations as to
residence, age, health, habits and moral character." (Sec. 6).
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Com-
monwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, said: "There are certain
fundamental rights of every citizen which are recognized in the
organic law of all our free American States. * * * The
declaration of rights in the constitution of Massachusetts enu-
merates among the natural, inalienable rights of men the right 'of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property.' * * * The
right to acquire, possess and protect property includes the right
to make reasonable contracts, which shall be under the protec-
tion of the law."
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Braceville Coal
Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 70, said:
"The fundamental principle upon which liberty is based, in
free and enlightened government, is equality under the law of
the land. It has accordingly been everywhere held, that lib-
erty, as that term is used in the constitution, means not only
freedom of the citizen from servitude and restraint, but is
deemed to embrace the right of every man to be free in the use
of his powers and faculties, and to adopt and pursue such avoca-
tion and calling as he may choose, subject only to the restraints
necessary to secure the common welfare."
The same court, in the great case of Ritchie v. People, 155
Ill. 98, x04, also said: "The privilege of contracting is both a
liberty and property right. * * * The right to use, buy and
sell property and contract in respect thereto is protected by the
constitution. Labor is property, and the laborer has the same
right to sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as
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has any other property owner. * * * The right to labor or
employ labor, and make contracts in respect thereto upon such
terms as may be agreed upon between the parties, is included
in the constitutional guaranty."
Thus it follows that the right of freedom of contract with the
largest employer of labor, is a property right which is protected
by the fundamental law (see also, Stimson's "Handbook to the
Labor Law of U. S.," pp. io, etc.); that all citizens, having the
proper requirements of age, health and character, have a
property right to compete for public as well as private employ-
ment. It is the great purpose of the merit system of appoint-
ment to give force and effect to this fundamental right of free
men.
We are now ready for the inquiry, whether the right to com-
pete for public employment extends, on behalf of the successful
competitors, beyond the threshold of such employment, there to
become a vested property right in the office itself. Unless offi-
ces exist to be held, the answer must be in the negative. A
fundamental principle of civil service reform is that public office
is a public trust. It is an opportunity to render a public service,
and whatever of personal honor and profit attach to it is but
incidental. The public has a right to the most efficient and de-
voted service, and to this end to continue competent and faith-
ful officials in its employment. Thus the public need, not per-
sonal interest, becomes and is the basis and measure of a just
tenure. Only in this view can "the public service be, indeed,
the public service" (Gladstone)-the property of the nation, not
an asset of a party boss or machine.
We may, therefore, conclude that the right to compete for
public employment is a property right of all; that this right is
part and parcel of the fundamental right of freedom of contract;
that a right of such importance ought to be given full force and
effect by positive law. We have seen that this is the purpose of
all civil service legislation. It also follows that public office is
not properly a subject of vested right; that official position is an
opportunity for public service, not a private property interest:
and that its control is an executive, not a judicial, function. If
these conclusions are sound, it remains for the executive to pre-
vent removals except for just cause. It does not follow that the
President's order is less wise because it is not properly enforce-
able by the courts. It will be to the lasting honor of the present
administration if it shall firmly establish a rule of executive
action to prevent removals without just cause.
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The evolution of modern democracy is from the simple and
primitive groups of kinsmen, known to us as village communi-
ties. The crude democracy of these isolated communities gave
way to the despotic feudal monarchy which welded them into
the great nation having a definite territory, uniform laws and
comparative freedom from local disorder. Then came the
long struggle for a democracy which should combine the great
advantages of a wide national authority with as much as prac-
ticable of the local self-government and personal freedom of the
village community. This struggle is marked by a long succes-
sion of popular victories over despotic privilege. The spoils
system in our day is a mercenary survival of feudal privilege.
Its destruction will remove another barrier from between the
people and their government. The merit system, in its purpose
"to intrench the principle and practice of Washington in the
law," seeks to recover a fundamental right of free men. To
such a purpose, complete success is sure. It may be here and
there delayed, but it will come.
Edwin Burriu Smith.
